MEMOL Approved For Release 2007/09/08 : CIA-RDP87B01034R000600150035-6

THE WHITE HOUSE

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February 27,1983

TO:

JAMES A. BAKER, III

CHIEF OF STAFF

FR:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT:

NSDD on Leaks

Jim:

On 17 August 1982, the attached NSDD was placed in the Darman system for comment and then presentation to the President. The directive resulted from an intensive interagency effort following several flagrant violations of law by disclosure of classified information similar to last week's disclosure of information concerning Sudan and Egypt. The delay in issuing this directive has led to questioning by the involved agencies. I believe we should move it.

Attachment:

Memo to the President Dtd August 17, 1982, "NSDD on Leaks"

NSC review completed

cc Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Attorney General Director of CIA



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

NSDD on Leaks

Issue

Whether to issue a National Security Decision Directive on leaks.

Facts

On January 12, you signed NSDD-19, which directed the agencies to improve protection against unauthorized disclosures of classified information, i.e., leaks. A subsequent memorandum asked Justice to chair an interdepartmental review of the effectiveness of existing statutes and regulations in this area. Bill Smith has forwarded the results of this review, with a recommendation that a second, more specific NSDD be issued. Bill's recommended NSDD, which has been reviewed by all elements of the national security community, is at Tab A.

Discussion

There is broad interdepartmental consensus that a more detailed NSDD is needed to help stem the tide of unauthorized disclosures. However, a number of the agencies are concerned about the NSDD language on two points: media contacts and polygraphs (paragraphs 1-d and 5, respectively). Bill Smith believes, and I agree, that issuing the NSDD without these provisions will signal to laskers that our approach is no more stringent than the ineffective measures of past Administrations. I would note, too, that the NSDD simply requires the agencies to develop policies on these two points. It does not mandate the substance or applicability of these policies, so that the agencies are free to tailor the policies to their own circumstances. In sum, if we are serious about trying to stop leaks, we must be prepared to take strong action, press and agency criticism notwithstanding.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u> <u>No</u>

1. That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed NSDD

Prepared by: Robert M. Kimmitt

cc Vice President
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